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A Resource Allocation model for a weapon system manager
was synthesized from several subprograms within the structure
of the Generalized Goal Decomposition model. The weapon sys-
tem allocation model describes the interaction of (1) a
weapon system manager who allocates resources, (2) a stock
point manager who desires to minimize cost by application of
the Economic Order Quantity model at his two sub units, and
(3) a Supply Officer of an activity that provides direct
weapon system support. The Supply Officer's objective is to
minimize time weighted backorders at each of his two sub units
The concepts of the Generalized Goal Decomposition approach
are used to model the information system that permits the
weapon system manager to allocate stock fund monies and supply
support personnel among the supply activities to attain an
optimal system solution, which minimizes the supply activity
managers' dissatisfaction. The model takes into account the
personal objectives of each supply activity manager. An
example problem is presented which illustrates the iterative
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I. INTRODUCTION
A weapon system manager is responsible for the develop-
ment, procurement, operation, maintenance and support of a
particular weapon system.
Repair parts and other consumables are currently available
to the weapon system operators and maintenance activities
through the Navy supply system. Although the weapon system
manager is responsible for the support of his weapon system,
he does not have control over those resources (people and
dollars) necessary to provide supply support [1] . Items with
low demand rates are procured and held on hand at operating
activities in accordance with allowance lists tailored to meet
the requirements of each activity and their associated weapon
systems. The range and depth of allowance items carried, how-
ever, depend upon "stock funds" made available for this purpose
from the inventory manager of the particular "cognizance class"
of the material. The allocation of these funds is not made
in accordance with the end use of material.
Items with high demand rates are stocked on the basis of
usage. The funds made available for stocking these items in
the supply system are a function of the demand rate and unit
cost of the item. Within a cognizance class, no significance
is placed on the end use of the item.
Supply support personnel are normally allocated to support




The purpose of this thesis is to propose an analytical
model of an information system that will allow a weapon sys-
tem manager to allocate resources, such as stock funds and
supply personnel, to supply support activities so as to attain
optimum support for his weapon system. The model takes into
account that the supply activity managers are not under the
administrative control of the weapon system manager and that
their operational objectives may (in general) differ from the
weapon system manager goals.
In the hypothetical multi-echelon supply support system
























The Supply Center procures and stocks weapon system material
for a geographical sector of the supply system. Its

operational sub units perform logistic functions such as deter-
mining replenishment requirements, procuring, warehousing and
shipping material.
The secondary stock point requisitions material from the
supply center with stock fund monies, stores material and ships
it to end user activity upon demand. Its operational sub
units perform the same logistic functions as above.
The Supply Department of an end user activity stocks, re-
plenishes and issues material to maintenance and weapon
system operating sub units of the same activity. The Supply
Department operational sub units determine stock requirements,
requisition stocks from the Secondary Stock Point, store the
material and issue it to end users. The end user activity
maintenance sub unit requisitions parts from the Supply De-
partment with operational funds. The weapon system opera-
tional sub units requisition consumable material from the
Supply Department with operational funds.
The weapon system manager in this hypothetical support
system has been given control over stock fund monies and
supply support personnel. His problem is to allocate these
resources so as to attain optimal support for his weapon sys-
tem. He must do this even though he does not have administra-
tive control over the support activities.
The Generalized Goal Decomposition (GGD) model was
developed by Timothy W. Ruefli [2] for a similar problem
—
allocating resources under the Program Planning and Budgeting
System of the Federal Government. Transformation of the GGD

model into the multi-echelon supply weapon system manager
model seemed a reasonable approach to the weapon system
manager's problem since the "weakness" of the GGD model is
precisely what was required in the weapon system support
model. The
N
GGD model assumes an administratively weak central
manager who sets policies and allocates resources, strong mid-
dle managers who drive the system by setting prices internal
to the system, and finally, sub unit managers of operational
units who have the required information necessary to make
optimal management decisions for each of their units, but do
not have the necessary information to make optimal solutions






Op. Unit Op. Unit Op. Unit Op. Unit
Figure 2.
By turning the model of Fig. 1 "sideways" so that (1) the
central manager corresponds to the weapon system manager,
(2) the middle managers correspond to the manager of the sup-
ply activities, and (3) the operational units correspond to
the operation division of the supply managers, the transforma-
tion of the support system of Fig. 1 into the organization of
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The solving of the system problem involves interactions
among the three levels of Fig. 3. In the Ruefli procedure
the solution process begins by the weapon system manager
making a preliminary allocation of resources and request for
services.
Since each manager of a supply activity has his own
opinion (different from other managers) about the relative
importance of resources consumed and outputs generated by his
activity, he will utilize those resources allocated to him in
a manner unique to his activity and his subjective desires.
His desires will be affected by the environmental, psycho-
logical and political climate at his activity and by his
previous experience as a supply manager. He will therefore
establish prices for resources and outputs that he alone
considers appropriate. The activity manager will not normal-
ly have complete information about the sub units under his
control. He must rely on proposals from the managers of his

sub units to accomplish those goals he considers important.
It is assumed that he can develop criteria for trade-offs
among resources. Therefore, some measure of importance must
be established for each resource consumed and each output
produced. This measure of importance will be a function of
the internal prices referred to earlier.
Given the set of prices established by the activity man-
ager, the sub unit manager can determine proposals associated
with optimal solutions for his unit. As the activity manager
receives proposals from each of his sub units, he can better
determine the value of the resources and outputs. Thus, he
can revise his original prices to agree with the additional
information he has received. He will pass these new prices
to the weapon system manager with the expectation of receiving
a larger allocation for those resources with higher prices and
a smaller allocation of those resources which have little
value to him.
The weapon system manager will be able to determine from
the prices received from the activity manager how his resources
should be allocated and how his production goals should be
adjusted to allow the system to attain optimal support for his
weapon system. Each time the system manager makes a realloca-
tion of goals, the activity manager computes a new set of
prices, and the sub unit manager computes a new set of pro-
posals. This process continues until the deviations from
the weapon system manager's goals are at a minimum. Neither
readjustment of goal level nor modifications of proposals on
10

the part of the supply activity sub units will yield a net
decrease in the deviations from the goal levels as a whole.
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Figure 4.




1. The Sub Unit Manager's Problem:
Minimize: TK




"k " C TTi,, , TT^ , ..- TTkm j
is a vector of internal prices generated by the
supply activity manager k in period t for m
resources and requirements.
y . = Technologic matrix describing the operation of
the sub unit j under supply activity k.
F\ • = A vector of stipulations which affect the produc-
tion feasibility of sub unit j under supply
activity k.
K , = A proposed solution (mix of resource inputs and
production outputs) in period t + 1 for sub unit
j under supply activity k. It is a (m x 1)
column vector of variables.
2. The Supply Activity Manager's Problem:
Minimize: ty* ^ + V/~ V* )
Subject to:





\a/ = a (1 x m) row vector of weights assigned to
positive deviations from the goals by supply
activity manager k.
\a/ = a (1 x m) row vector of weights assigned to
negative deviations from the goals by supply
activity manager k.
E>
* = a (m x 1) column vector proposal from sub unit j
k »
** under supply activity k in period t.
T = (m x m) identity matrix.
fc> a (m x 1) vector of goals (resources and outputs)
allocated to supply activity k for period t.
V = a (m x 1) column vector of positive deviations
from the goals by supply activity k.
C>)K
a (m x 1) column vector of negative deviations
from the goals by supply activity k.
activity level (as a fraction of the proposed
level) of sub unit j proposal made in period t,
Maximize:
3. The Weapon System Manager's Problem:
k
Subject to: J~ R k Q K Sc = ^o ,
k
and a?** >o Ck. i.*,— fm^
where
"ff = a (1 x m) row vector of internal prices generatedK
by supply activity manager k during period t.
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K,. = matrix of coefficients relating the goal levels
of the supply activities. Provides transforma-
tion rates or weights that relate G ' s to Gk o
d = a (m x 1) column vector of global (total system)
resources and requirements.
£% = a (m x 1) column vector of revised goals to be
allocated to supply activity k for period t + 1.
S = a (m x 1) column vector of slack variables.
The three problems are solved sequentially in accordance with
Fig. 4, where the Goals correspond to g} of the weapon system
managers problem; the prices correspond to the value of II^ ,
the dual variables associated with the goal constraints, of
the supply activity manager's problem; finally, (3) the pro-
posals are the same proposals, P.;, 'of the sub unit manager's
problem. If the goal levels, alternatives (proposals), and
shadow prices are generated using the rules of the simplex pro-
cedure, the process will terminate in a finite number of
iterations [3] . The initial allocation of resources by the
weapon system manager and the initial prices assigned by the





As observed in the previous section, Ruefli's Generalized
Goal Decomposition model is similar in concept to the re-
source allocation model for a weapon system manager. There
are, however, differences that should be noted.
The operating unit problem was represented as a linear
program in the GGD model. A linear program would not, in
general, adequately describe the behavior of a supply activity
sub unit. Further, it is not necessary that a sub unit of a
stock point have the same objectives and constraints that a
sub unit of an end user activity Supply Department. The sub
model used to describe the behavior of the sub units in the
resource allocation model may vary from the simplest determin-
istic lot size model [4] to complex multi-item probabilistic
time weighted backorder model [5] . For sake of illustration,
a form of both will be used so as to (1) demonstrate the
ability of the allocation model to find a solution for a system
structure that has diverse objectives among its supply activi-
ties, and (2) to illustrate the flexibility of the allocation
model concept when applied to multi-echelon supply systems.
Since only a two echelon supply system model is necessary to
illustrate the concepts, this thesis will be limited to the
interactions of (1) stock point with two sub units, (2) an
end user activity supply department with two sub units, and
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Sub Unit 1 Sub Unit 2 Sub Unit 1 Sub Unit 2
Figure 5.
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B. THE STOCK POINT SUB UNIT PROBLEM
Currently, most supply activity in the Naval Supply Sys-
tem use a form of a deterministic lot size model [4] to
determine their stock requirements. Therefore, it will be
assumed that the Stock Point behavior can be so described.
The objective of the stock point is to minimize cost while
maintaining enough stock on hand so as to fill all demands.
Since demand is assumed deterministic, "perfect" supply avail-
ability (no stock outs) can be attained.
It will be assumed for simplicity that each of the sub
units stock only one item.
The sub units are assumed to be evaluated by the Stock
Point Manager on three points: (1) the total cost for operat-
ing their unit, (2) the cost of holding inventory at their




The total cost K, for operating the stock point sub unit
is the sum of (1) ordering cost equal to
-^ A, where A is the
cost of processing an order , A is the demand per unit time
for material and Q is the quantity of material ordered by
each order, and (2) holding cost equal to IC S , where IC is
the inventory carrying cost per unit of inventory and y is
the average inventory on hand [7] . Therefore, K = - A + IC j
The cost, q, , of holding inventory, as above, is IC 2- .
The number of people, g2 , required to operate the sub
unit is assumed to be a linear function of the number of
orders processed. Therefore, 9o = do ' where q i- s the number
of orders processed per period and p is a factor equal to
average number of people required to process them.
The stock point sub unit problem is:
minimize : z -ttk k + tt; g, +wt g*,
XA re 3
such that: \< » —
g





where: 71*^ = price for an operational cost dollar,
JT = price of an inventory holding cost dollar,
TT^ = price per person required to operate the
unit.
This problem is nonlinear in the decision variable Q
in both the objective function and the constraints. The
17

constraints region is convex as is the objective function;
therefore, a solution can be obtained from setting
and solving for Q.
C. THE SUPPLY DEPARTMENT SUB UNIT PROBLEM:
The Supply Officer of a Naval activity which operates
weapon systems is likely to put great importance on the
length of time a requisition, not filled by his stock, is held
as a backorder on his department. The critical resources
necessary for his operation sub units are normally stock fund
monies and supply support personnel. Therefore, it is assumed
he will evaluate his sub units on: (1) time weighted back-
orders outstanding (i.e., No. backorder x length of time out-
standing in their unit) , (2) the cost of holding inventory at
their unit, and (3) the number of people required to operate
their unit. For simplicity of illustration, it is assumed
each sub unit stocks one item.
The time weighted backorder [5] B, is equal to:
where: Q is the quantity per order, r is the reorder
2level, u is the expected lead time demand, a
is the variance of the lead time demand; $(r) is









The cost, g, , of holding inventory is
jcfrt-2. — Zcl > where IC is the inventory
carrying cost and f"*"^ "jU" is the average
inventory on hand
.
The number of people, g2 , required to operate the sub
unit is, as before, -£- . The Supply Department sub unit
problem is:






where: fT^ = price of a unit backorder per period,
"fTi
= price of an inventory holding cost
dollar,
TT^ = price per person required to operate
the unit.
This problem is nonlinear in the decision variables r
and Q in both the objective function and constraints. The
constraint region is convex as is the objective function [5]
but the objective function is not easily differentiated and
the calculus cannot be used as before. Reference 5 provides
a solution procedure utilizing numerical methods.
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D. THE STOCK POINT MANAGER'S PROBLEM
The stock point manager, as stated before, is assumed to
consider three measures important in the operation of his
activity: (1) the total cost of operating the sub units,
(2) the total stock, fund monies required to pay for inventory
holding cost, and (3) the total number of people required to
operate his activity. The operations of the individual sub
units are assumed to be independent of each other. Thus, it
is reasonable to assume that his objectives will be based on
the sum of the two sub units performance measures. It is fur-
ther assumed that he can weight these objectives "a priori"
according to what he considers is their relative worth. It is
assumed that the manager receives linear satisfaction returns
from each of the performance factors. This assumption is more
restrictive but still reasonable for small changes in levels
of operations. For example, it may not be true that requiring
only half as many people to do a job will double the stock
point manager's satisfaction, but it is reasonable that a 10%
reduction in personnel requirements will increase his satisfac-
tion approximately 10%. The same is true for the other two
measures of performance. Under these assumptions, linearity
of objectives and additivity of constraints can be assumed [6]
,
Therefore, the GGD model for the middle manager will apply
in the weapon support system allocation model. Based on his
past experience and present environment, it is assumed that
the stock point manager can determine the following weights
in his objective function:
20

«/*ts £ when his personal goal for total operational
cost is zero. This implies that he considers total
operational costs of this activity important and he
would like to reduce these costs as close to zero as





«Ci when the goal for inventory holding cost is
equal to the currently assigned goal from the weapon
system manager. Although he feels total operation
costs are important, he feels that stock fund monies
are ^i /c K times more important to the system. W/"-
because he feels that if an allocation of stock fund
monies is made, there is no utility in not using it.
u/ +»(J because he feels that support personnel are
times as important as stock fund monies. W^=0
because not utilizing people assigned, has no worth.
The stock point manager's problem is:
c»C + CVS + csS
,
subject to: Z \V P,W * £ I? Pf " I YJT * I Y» = G,***
minimize:
and
where: The JK* $ and \ $ are as previously defined,
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E. SUPPLY OFFICER'S PROBLEM:
The Supply Officer, as stated before, is assumed to con-
sider three measures important in the operation of his sub
units: (1) time weighted backorders , (2) inventory holding
costs for which he requires stock fund monies and (3) the
number of people required to operate his sub units. The same
assumption about additivity of constraints and linearity of
his objective function made in the case of the stock point
manager apply to the Supply Officer of the end user activity.
Therefore, the GGD sub model for the middle manager will
apply. Based on his past experience and present environment,
it is assumed that the supply officer has the following
weights in his objective function "a priori":
Wg r C#a when his personal goal for total backorders
is zero. This implies that he considers total time
weighted backorders a very important measure of per-
formance for his activity and would like to reduce
backorders as close to zero as possible. (W q is
meaningless since his activity cannot have negative
backorders.
Wj » C, when the goal for inventory holding cost
equal to the currently assigned goal from the weapon
system manager. Although he feels inventory holding
costs are important, he feels that suffering a unit
22

period backorder for the weapon system is ^3/C
t
times more costly. W" " because he feels if al-
located stock funds are not used they have no worth.
^/, C C» because he feels that support personnel are
C*l./Ci times as important as stock fund monies and
\jj£ « © because not utilizing people assigned has no
worth.
mi
The Supply Officer's problem is:
inimize: £g Yft Cx Y, * C% Yv M
(Z) rs<*> fcj





C x?\ tf, vm- >o *..,»,...,
&J, u» ;-




F. THE WEAPON SYSTEM MANAGER'S PROBLEM
The weapon system manager wishes to maximize the supply
support of his weapon system. He is not in a position to
evaluate the support directly; therefore, he must rely on the
information he can get from the various activities that sup-
port his weapon system and those which are supported.
Because the activities which are supported would not be able
23

to determine what would give better support, it is reasonable
to assume that only the supporting activities have enough
information to be of use. Because the managers of these
various activities will value resources and requirements dif-
ferently, a reasonable approach to the problem would be to
set policies for the system and then allocate resources such
that deviation from these policies is at a minimum. The GGD
model sets forth a formal structure to provide the weapon sys-
tem manager with the information to determine "what x amount
of resources will provide in weapon system support." The use
of the II values (dual variables) in his objective function is
the same as considering all the constraints (at all echelons)
of the system simultaneously [7], Therefore, it is reasonable
to assume that maximizing the value of resources by allocating
them to the strongest need is a linear objective. The weapon
system manager redistributes resources of the total system
within the system. Thus it is reasonable to assume that his
problem constraints are additive. Therefore, the GGD sub
model for the central manager will apply.
The weapon system manager's problem is:
maximize: ?
subjec
c n« '«.* «•» **?&sv« -w,rc<fi£ «cl,
24

subject to: <£ yj* = |
where: TTjj = value of resource i according to supply
activity manager j
,
Gio = total system quantity of resource i,
G»t 4
* = quantity of resource i allocated to supply






It should be noted that the II values received from the various
supply activity managers are affected by his personal scale
of values. Therefore, the weapon system manager should
normalize the II values before using them in the problem. When
an excess of a particular resource exists at a supply activity,
the II value for that resource will be zero because the con-
straint will not be binding for that goal. In this case, the
supply activity is required to tell the weapon system manager
how many units are required of the resource to maintain the
present activity level of the supply activity. In a real
world situation this statement would be, "The value of more
resource i is zero as long as x amount is allocated to this
25

activity." The weapon system manager must then place an
additional constraint in his problem assuring the alloca-
tion of x units of resource i to the supply activity. This
situation can be observed in the example problem.
26

III. EXAMPLE PROBLEM SOLUTION
To illustrate the solution procedure of the "Resource
Allocation Model for a Weapon System Manager/' a numerical
example is presented. The following parametric values are




= $2000 in stock fund monies and G20 = 24 supply
support personnel. The values assigned to the resources by
the stock point manager are: C, = 1, C, = 10 and C
2
= 100.
The values assigned by the Supply Officer of the end use
activity are: C = 200, C, = 1 and C
2
= 200. The sub units
of the supply activities are assumed to have the following
operational parameters: Stock Point Sub Unit Number One,
X, = 200, A, = 40, IC, = 10 and p, = 1; Stock Point Sub Unit
Number Two, A 2 = 1000, A 2 = 100, IC 2 = 20 and p 2 = 2; Supply
Department Sub Unit Number One, A, = 10, IC, = 100, y, = 10,^ =





= 50, y 2
= 20, a 2 = 20 and p 2 = 1.
The solution procedure begins with the weapon system manager
making an ad hoc resource allocation: Stock Point, GJ, = $600
and G£
2
= 15 people; Supply Department, g| 2 = $1400 and
G22 = 9 people. After receiving the allocation, the stock
point manager passes the following prices to his sub units:
n^
1
* = 1, nj 1 * = and id 1 * =0. (He wants to minimize total
operating cost as much as possible.) The Supply Officer passes
to his sub units the following prices: II * ' = 200, II j = 1
and n^ 1 * equal to 200.
27

The sub units now have the required information necessary
to make their first proposals. Stock Point Sub Unit Number
(1) 00 andOne proposes P' , a vector where: K, = 400, g,, = 2
(2)
g2 , = 5. Stock Point Sub Unit Number Two proposes P, , a
vector where: K
2
= 2000, g, 2 = 1000 and g22 = 5. Supply
Department Sub Unit Number One finds a solution to his problem
but g21 is equal to zero. This implies that it would be more
economical to incur backorder cost than to stock the material.
If it is assumed, however, that the Supply Officer will not
allow the disestablishment of the sub unit, he would change
the non-negativity constraint to g 2 , >. 1. The sub unit
manager's solution to the modified problem allows him to make
his first proposal, pj , a vector where: B1 = 4.29, g,, = 100
and g2 , = 1. Supply Department Sub Unit Number Two proposes
(2)
a vector where: B., , « s^^j. vyxx^o.^. ^ 2 - 2.87, g-, 2 = 1450 and g22 = 4.










and the Y's and X's non-negative
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The stock point manager is interested in the dual of this
problem. The solution: n^ 2) = 1, nj 2) 10 and n^ 2) = if
G~ > 10, gives him his prices to be passed to the sub units
and weapon system manager during this, the second iteration
Similarly the Supply Officer finds his new prices from the





* 1 Y* + 2oo V^,
c
y0)
and Y's and X's non-negative
(2)His solution is: II 200, n (2) 1 and n (2) if G22 > 5
excess (i.e., n^ 1 * = n^ 2) = and G,
2
+ G22
The weapon system manager should now have enough informa-
tion to make a reallocation for the third iteration but his
problem is degenerate. Since supply support personnel are in
= 24 > 10) , it is
reasonable to assume he will normalize the prices on the
relative weights the supply activity managers placed on the
only other resource of the problem. Therefore the II values
received from the stock point manager will be divided by 10.
This makes the objective function the same as the only bind-
ing constraint in his problem. Therefore it is degenerate.
He is assumed to consider himself as a "tie breaker" in this
case and will allocate the resource towards the end use
29

activity since he feels that its objective aligns closer to
his than those of the stock point. Therefore his second
allocation of resources is: G^ = 400, G^
'
= 10, g[V ~ 1600
and G22 = 10. (Note that the G21 >. 10 constraint is met.)
The stock point sub units make their second proposals:









= 3633, g, 2 = 300 and g22 = 16.7. The supply department
sub units second proposals are: P
2
where B, = 4.29, g,, = 100




= 2.56, g 12 = 1250 and
g 99 = 10.22
The Supply Activity managers solve for their third itera-
tion prices. They are: for the stock point - IU = 1,
nj 3) = 10 and n^ 3) = 100; for the supply department - II 200
II. = if G,
2




> 5. These prices and




The weapon system manager has the problem:







-25, y^ = - 75 ' t{ 2) = - 25 and Y 2 2) =
.75; implies that: G,, = 450, G21 = 11.75, G12 = 1550 and
g22 = 9.95.
During the same iteration (third) , the sub units make
their proposals. Stock point sub units propose: P^ where
K
x






= 370 and g 22 = 13.5. The supply department sub units
have no change in their proposals.
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Based on this final set of proposals there are no
changes to the activity manager's prices, or the weapon sys-
tem manager's allocation. The present solution is optimal.
A summary of the normalized manager's cost (dissatisfaction)
is:
ITERATION STOCK POINT SUPPLY DEPT. TOTAL
1 840 1582 2422
2 1040 1370 2410
3 836 1370 2206
32

IV. DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL
A. ASSUMPTIONS
The resource allocation model for a weapon system manager
was developed to show how the Generalized Goal Decomposition
model concept could be used in a multi-echelon supply support
structure. The use of the deterministic lot size model and
the time weighted backorder model to describe the behavior of
the supply activity sub units was to illustrate an application
of the concept . In a "real world" application, the assumptions
of the two sub models would be too restrictive to give precise
results.
The deterministic lot size model (or Economic Order
Quantity Model — EOQ) assumes no stock outs. Most supply
activities currently use a modification of the EOQ model where
the effects of uncertain demand and procurement lead time are
offset by a variable safety level model. The model presented
by this study does not account for this added complexity.
The Time Weighted Backorder model assumes normally dis-
tributed lead time demand. Many conflicting opinions prevail
about this assumption. The author, at this writing, has no
personal opinion as to its use except to state that it is an
assumption of the model and it is a way to incorporate some
stochastic influence into the structure.
Each sub unit of the supply activity was assumed to manage
one item. This was purely a simplifying assumption and was
33

not reasonable for a "real world" inventory system. Reference
5 gives a specific formulation of a multi-item inventory
problem with time weighted backorder objective function. The
reference suggests the use of Sequential Unconstrained Mini-
mization Technique (SUMT) for solving the problem. The
computational complexity invoked by using the multi-item
problem would more than offset analytical gains in this con-
ceptual study.
The number of people required to run the supply activity
sub units was assumed to be a linear function of the number of
orders processed by the sub unit. "A priori" this is a reason-
able assumption as long as the activity levels of the sub units
remain near the current operating level. An investigation into
increasing and decreasing returns to scale would be necessary
to determine for what span of activity levels the linearity
assumption is valid.
The time weighted backorder objective function for the
Supply Officer is not the complete answer to his problem. He
and the weapon system manager want to maximize the number of
operational weapon system units by minimizing the number of
units not operational for back ordered repair parts. Since
one weapon system unit may have many different parts required
for its repair or many units may require only one part for
their repair, the time weighted backorder formulation is not
a complete answer.
The Stock Point Manager's and the Supply Officer's problem
assume linear returns of satisfaction. As stated in the
34

formulation, this would be only an approximation to "real
world" manager's utility functions. The argument presented
by Ref. 6 holds for only small deviations from the manager's
goals
.
The weapon system manager's objective function was
assumed to be linear. The validity of this assumption would
depend upon the structure of the system being modeled. How-
ever, the use of the H values as a force to drive the system,
has considerable appeal since the II values are generated
through consideration of all the system's constraints simulta-
neously. In light of this, the linear assumption should yield
a good "first" solution to the weapon system manager's problem.
B. GENERALIZATIONS
The relationship of the information structure to the
organizational structure in a system affects the performance
of the system. The development of the resource allocation
model for a weapon system manager was to illustrate how an
information structure — as it relates to the organization struc-
ture — could be modeled. The model developed is simplistic in
nature, but illustrates the concept which is to be illustrated.
The organization of the model is composed of a series of
information systems. If the tasks associated with those sys-
tems are interdependent, it is necessary to consider the inter-
dependences among the information systems. The model deals
with this problem because it permits, in part, a representa-
tion of the relation between different information structures
and the organization structure of the system. The model
35

involves two types of decentralization — the decentralization of
the resource allocation process and the decentralization of
alternative generation processes in the supply activity sub
units. Only the goal setting function of the weapon system
manager is centralized. The relationship among the supply
activities and the weapon system manager is conceptually
similar to the GGD model. The relationship between the sup-
ply activity managers and their sub units are similar to the
Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition models [8] . As in the GGD model,
the weapon system manager's model assumes the manager achieves
coordination through goal-setting rather than price setting.
Prices are used in the model, but they are generated by the
supply activity managers. Therefore, the weapon system
manager can be interpreted as a policy setting entity and
the supply activity managers as administrative entities. If
computation difficulties are acceptable in the supply activity
sub unit model, the constraint space need only be convex.
Therefore, probabilistic and nonlinear relationships may be
utilized [9], In the example problem, textbook formulas were
used to represent the sub units operation. This sterile
approach was not necessary for the utilization of the model.
Input—output, regression or rule of thumb models could have
provided satisfactory results consistent with their ability
to track the required relationships. The use of the text-
book models in the example was to illustrate an upper bound
on the real world system's effectiveness (i.e., the EOQ model
assumes no stockouts, steady state, perfect forecasting, no
obsolescence, no mistakes, no coffee breaks, etc).
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The supply activity manager's models need be linear only
in the constraints. The objective function of the manager
may be formulated as a quadratic loss function (i.e.,
, but the resultant computation problems
are increased. Reference 6 illustrates explicit uses of
linear approximation to nonlinear objective (utility) func-
tions when deviation from a central operating point is not
extreme. This would normally be the case where analysis is
made on a presently operating system. If a quadratic loss
function is necessary to obtain the desired results, the
quadratic program can be transformed into a linear program
using Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Reference 7, pages 575-580 ex-
plains this transformation.
The resource allocation model for a weapon system manager
assumes he has no management or directive control over the
supply activity managers or their sub units. He must attain
his desires by coordination, through allocation of resources
and requirements.
Allocation of resources is straightforward but allocation
of requirements without directional control needs clarification,
By way of example: The support effectiveness of an end user
will necessarily be a function of the support effectiveness
of the next higher echelon of support. Since the model assumes
that the various activities are in competition for system
resources, allocating most of the resources to the end user
in order to increase his support effectiveness may decrease
it because of poor performance of the higher echelons due
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to their lack of resources. If "support effectiveness at
activity k" is considered a resource to the end user and a
requirement to supply activity k, the end user must make a
trade-off analysis as to how much the "support effectiveness
of supply activity k" is worth in terms of other resources.
This is what the GGD model does by establishing goals as
variables and determining the value of each goal to the
manager. The relative worth of the various goals to the sup-
ply activity manager is the value of the dual variables of
his minimization problem. References 7 and 8 discuss the
theory and appropriateness of using the values of the dual
variables as production shadow prices (i.e., value of re-
sources internal to a production system)
.
The strength of this model lies in its ability to describe
the economic behavior of various supply activity managers when
their objective functions do not align with the total system
objective function. In fact, there is no total system objec-
tive function. Each activity manager values resources and
outputs differently than his counterparts at other activities.
The model requires the manager to assign his personal values
"a priori." The solution to the dual of the supply manager's
problem provides the II value that establishes the relative
values of resources and requirements based on what he feels
is important and what is important to the system.
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V. EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
A. THE n-LEVEL STRUCTURE
The Resource Allocation model for a weapon system manager
may be extended to cover the general n-level organization. If
resources and requirements are to be allocated through more
than three (say n) levels of managers, the model can be ap-
plied successively to three levels at a time starting (after
the preliminary goal distribution) with the three lowest
(including the operational units) levels. As prices are gen-
erated the model is applied to successively higher levels
until the prices reach the uppermost level (the manager with
the total resources) . He then makes a revised allocation of
the resources and requirements and the model is applied to
three levels at a time but to successively lower levels until
alternate proposals are made. The process continues until an
optimum (in the goal programming sense) is reached. A possible
Navy application of the n-level model is shown in Fig. 6.
B. STRUCTURE ANALYSIS
The Resource Allocation model for a weapon system manager
has a useful feature not included in other decomposition
models. Its formulation implies that the solution reached
depends on the structure of the organization being modeled.
Other decomposition models yield optimal solutions which are
independent of the nature of the decentralization. This is
true because the purpose of classic decomposition models has
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been to find a technique which would find the same solution
by a decentralized model that would be found by a centralized
model. This is a reasonable objective if the organization is
trying to attain the objectives of a strong central manager.
This model depends on sub-optimization by middle manager in
response to policies set by an administratively weak central
manager. If the sub-optimization is ruled out as a possi-
bility, then the dimensions of the organization are relevant
only to the mechanics of reaching a solution. Therefore, the
effects of the organization are eliminated. However, the
weapon system manager's allocation model is sensitive to
organization structure. Therefore, it can be used to analyze
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alternative organizations to determine which structure
yields the best benefits. Typical examples would be to com-
bine, omit, and add echelons of supply support to determine
how many levels provide the best support for a particular
weapon system.
C. MULTI-WEAPON SYSTEM MANAGER'S PROBLEM
Figure 6 illustrates a further area which could be studied
by an approach similar to the Allocation model for a weapon
system manager. If the supply support units receive resources
from many different weapon system managers, the formulation of
the model becomes even more complex. The presence of items
of support which are common to many weapon systems would not






A Resource Allocation model for a weapon system manager
was synthesized from several sub programs within the structure
of the Generalized Goal Decomposition Model. The weapon sys-
tem allocation model describes the interaction of (1) a
weapon system manager who allocates resources, (2) a stock
point manager who desires to minimize cost by application of
the Economic Order Quantity model at his two sub units, and
(3) a Supply Officer of an activity that provides direct
weapon system support. The Supply Officer's objective is to
minimize time weighted backorders at each of his two sub
units.
The concepts of the Generalized Goal Decomposition ap-
.
proach are used to model the information system that permits
the weapon system manager to allocate stock fund monies and
supply support personnel among the supply activities to attain
an optimal system solution which minimizes the supply activity
managers* dissatisfaction.
The model takes into account the personal objectives of
the supply activity managers. These objectives are, in
general, different from other supply managers. The managers
are required to assign values (prices) to the resources'^
priori." It is these prices that drive the system.
An example problem is presented which illustrates the
iterative solution technique required to find the optimal system
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solution. The solution procedure utilizes Wolf-Dantzig
Decomposition procedures between the activity managers and
their sub units. The value of the dual variables of the sup-
ply activity manager's solution to his own activity decomposi-
tion problem is passed to the weapon system manager as an
indication of what each resource is worth to the supply
activity. The weapon system manager is then able to reallocate
his resources to the greatest system need.
The model presented makes many restrictive assumptions
for sake of simplicity; however, the purpose of the presenta-
tion is to illustrate an analytical approach to a problem
involving the personal opinions of the system managers. Thus,
the value of the presentation lies more in its concepts than
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